S&P Türkiye'nin kredi notunun
görünümünü pozitiften nötre çevirdi. Kuruluş Türkiye'nin dünyada azalan talep
nedeniyle özellikle dış ticaret dengesindeki riske dikkat çekti. S&P
uluslararası finansman koşullarında da daralma olduğuna dikkat çekti. Kuruluş Türkiye'nin net dış borcunun
yüksekliğine dikkat çekti. Ayrıca S&P Türkiye'nin milli gelirine bakıldığında
ticaret partnerlerinin altında bir milli gelire sahip olduğu ve işgücü
verimliliğinin düşük olduğuna vurguladı. S&P ayrıca kadın istihdamının
düşüklüğünün de altını çizdi. Kuruluş Türkiye'nin 2012 yılı büyüme oranını da
yüzde 2 olarak açıkladı. S&P'nin Türkiye ile ilgili raporunun orjinalini
okumak için haberin devamını tıklayın.
·
In our view, less-buoyant external demand
and worsening terms of trade
·
could inhibit Turkey's economic
rebalancing.
·
We are therefore revising our outlook on
Turkey's long-term foreign and
·
local currency sovereign credit ratings to
stable from positive,
·
reflecting our view that the ratings on
Turkey are likely to stay at the
·
current level during the next 12 months.
·
We are affirming our long- and short-term
foreign currency sovereign
·
credit ratings on Turkey at 'BB/B' and our
long- and short-term local
·
currency ratings at 'BBB-/A-3'.
LONDON (Standard & Poor's) May 1,
2012--Standard & Poor's Ratings Services today revised the outlook on
Turkey's long-term foreign and local currency sovereign credit ratings to
stable, from positive. At the same time, we
affirmed our 'BB/B' foreign currency and
'BBB-/A-3' local currency long- and
short-term sovereign credit ratings on
Turkey. We also affirmed the Turkey
long- and short-term national scale
ratings at 'trAA+/trA-1'. The '3' recovery
rating and 'BBB–' transfer and
convertibility (T&C) assessment remain
unchanged.
Less-buoyant external demand and worsening
terms of trade (the price of
exports compared to imports) have, in our
view, made economic rebalancing more difficult, and have increased the risks to
Turkey's creditworthiness given its high external debt and the state budget's
reliance on indirect tax revenues.
We have revised the outlook on Turkey's
long-term sovereign credit ratings to
stable from positive, reflecting our view
that the ratings are likely to
remain at the current level during the
next 12 months.
Under our sovereign ratings criteria (see
"Related Criteria And Research"
below), the key constraints on Turkey's
ratings are:
·
Its external vulnerability as measured by
high net external debt and
·
gross external financing needs relative to
its capacity to generate
·
foreign currency (measured by current
account receipts [CARs]).
·
Modest income levels. We estimate Turkey's
GDP per capita at $9,840 at
·
end-2011, which is below the majority of
its trading partners but
·
compares well with similarly rated
sovereigns. This reflects modest
·
levels of absolute productivity, as well
as low labor participation
·
rates, especially among women.
·
Risks related to the 2010-2011 credit
boom. Turkey's real GDP growth of
·
more than 8% annually over the past two
years was mostly driven by rapid
·
domestic credit expansion, financed mainly
by short-term external funding
·
to banks. Domestic demand, particularly
via import-intensive private
·
consumption and investment in nontradable
sectors, mainly contributed to
·
this rapid GDP growth.
As a result of the above factors, Turkey's
current account deficit (CAD)
exceeded 40% of CARs in 2011 (about 10% of
GDP) and the financial sector's net external debt rose to 40% of CARs at
end-2011, versus 7% at end-2009. We
estimate that Turkey's gross external
financing needs (current account balance
plus short-term external debt by residual
maturity) will reach 142% of CARs
plus usable reserves in 2012, one of the
highest ratios for a rated sovereign.
This heavy reliance on external savings
exposes Turkey to shocks, either
domestic--for example if recent high
domestic credit growth were to result in
future bad loans--or external, say if
rising risk aversion were to deter
foreign investors and banks and result in
a net outflow of foreign capital.
Such external shocks could lead to a rapid
depreciation of the Turkish lira,
with a significant pass-through to
inflation. In turn this could increase
domestic interest rates and have a
potential negative secondary effect on
government borrowing costs. In addition,
we note that Turkish banks obtained
about $14.8 billion (8% of CARs) of foreign
currency funding through
repurchase agreements of local currency
securities with foreign banks at
end-2011; this exposes banks to margin
calls should bond prices fall or the
Turkish lira depreciate.
Our ratings on Turkey are supported by our
view of its generally effective
policymaking and institutions, its
moderate and declining public debt burden,
and its monetary policy flexibility. In
our view, a floating exchange rate
regime can work as a channel of nominal
adjustment for economies like Turkey that are exposed to potentially volatile
capital inflows. As the Turkish lira has weakened since the second half of
2011, we expect domestic demand for imports to moderate and Turkish exports to
become more competitive. However, we believe the competitiveness gain from
weaker exchange rates will probably be partly offset by wage inflation through
indexation. During fourth-quarter 2011, credit growth decelerated as the cost
of external funding increased. The Banking Regulation and Supervisory Agency of
Turkey has also implemented macroprudential measures that have helped manage
credit growth. In our view, however, Turkey's central bank's monetary
policy--with stable policy repo rates but frequently adjusted and diverging
overnight rates--has been less effective in influencing monetary conditions or
narrowing Turkey's sizable external
deficit. This has been partly due to the highly accommodative monetary policies
of global central banks in advanced economies.
We believe that the government will aim to
stabilize net general government
debt to GDP at around 35% by 2015, despite
our expectation that GDP will slow to 2%
in 2012 as credit growth decelerates. We estimate that the general
government primary surplus will likely
have reached 1% of GDP in 2011 before
deteriorating mildly over the ratings
horizon (2012-2015) due to our forecast
of economic slowdown. In our opinion, much
of 2011's expected fiscal
outperformance is due to temporary factors,
including what we view to have
been an unsustainable, credit-driven,
year-on-year expansion of nominal GDP by some 15%, as well as the government's
success in raising funds by tax
amnesties. While Turkey's large and
resilient economy benefits from a young
and rapidly growing population, the social
security deficit continues to be
the major driver of headline general
government deficit, highlighting the need
for social security reform.
The stable outlook reflects our view that
the key risks to the Turkish economy
will likely remain in balance in the next
12 months.
If external demand is stronger than we
have assumed in our base case scenario, and the Turkish economy continues to
shift toward net-export-driven growth, its external imbalances could unwind
without the fiscal accounts significantly weakening or banks destabilizing. As
of April 2012, the banking sector continued to report a loan-to-deposit ratio
of just under 100%, compared with less than 80% at end-2009. As Turkey moves
toward more-balanced and sustainable growth, its sovereign credit standing
could improve.
We could consider a positive rating action
if we see that structural reforms
to the social security and energy sectors,
and to education and labor policy,
have boosted foreign direct investment and
GDP growth. Creditworthiness could also improve, in our view, were the Turkish
government to rationalize public spending and reduce budgetary vulnerabilities in
the medium-to-long term.
On the other hand, if external demand is
weaker than our baseline assumption,
or Turkey's oil import price rises further
and external financing costs
increase, economic adjustment would be
seen in a sharper contraction in
domestic demand. In our view, this could
adversely affect Turkey's fiscal
account as well as Turkish banks' credit
quality, thus potentially weakening
Turkey's creditworthiness and placing
pressure on the ratings.
Moreover, a continued abundant supply of
liquidity, globally, could exacerbate
imbalances in Turkey. In our view, a
delayed correction would increase the
risk of reduced access to external funding
and could also weaken the
government's fiscal accounts beyond our
current expectations, which could
place downward pressure on the ratings.
 çevirdi. Peki gerekçeler neler? S&P hangi risklere dikkat çekti?){kind=link}