Uluslararası derecelendirme
kuruluşu S&P Yunanistan'ın kredi notunu CC(junk) seviyesinde SD (selective
default) seviyesine indirdi. Kuruluş
ülkenin notunu borç ödemeleri düzenli şekilde devam ederse yeniden
yükseltebileceğini de açıkladı. Yunanistan Maliye Bakanı Venizelos S&P'nin
not indirimini beklediklerini ve bunun fiyatlandığını söyledi. S&P'nin
Yunanistan ile ilgili orjinal açıklamasını okumak için haberin devamını
tıklayın.- S&P'nin notlarının ne anlama geliyor haberi için tıklayın
LONDON
(Standard & Poor's) Feb. 27, 2012--Standard & Poor's Ratings Services
said today that it has lowered its 'CC' long-term and 'C' short-term sovereign
credit ratings on the Hellenic Republic (Greece) to 'SD' (selective default).
Our recovery rating of '4' on Greece's foreign-currency issue ratings is
unchanged. Our country transfer and convertibility (T&C) assessment for
Greece, as for all other eurozone members, remains 'AAA'.
We lowered our sovereign credit ratings on Greece to 'SD' following the
Greek government's retroactive insertion of collective action clauses (CACs) in
the documentation of certain series of its sovereign debt on Feb. 23, 2012. The
effect of a CAC is to bind all bondholders of a particular series to amended
bond payment terms in the event that a predefined quorum of creditors has
agreed to do so. In our opinion, Greece's retroactive insertion of CACs
materially changes the original terms of the affected debt and constitutes the launch
of what we consider to be a distressed debt restructuring. Under our criteria,
either condition is grounds for us to lower our sovereign credit rating on
Greece to 'SD' and our ratings on the affected debt issues to 'D'.
As we have previously stated, we may view an issuer's unilateral change
of the original terms and conditions of an obligation as a de facto
restructuring and thus a default by Standard & Poor's published definition
(see "Retroactive
Application Of Collective Action Clauses Would Constitute A Selective Default
By Greece," Feb.
10, 2012, and "Rating
Implications Of Exchange Offers And Similar Restructurings, Update," May 12, 2009). Under our criteria, the
definition of restructuring includes exchange offers featuring the issuance of
new debt with less-favorable terms than those of the original issue without
what we view to be adequate offsetting compensation. Such less-favorable terms
could include a reduced principal amount, extended maturities, a lower coupon,
a different payment currency, different legal characteristics that affect debt
service, or effective subordination.
We do not generally view CACs (to the extent that they are included in
an original issuance) as changing a government's incentive to pay its
obligations in full and on time. However, we believe that the retroactive
insertion of CACs will diminish bondholders' bargaining power in an upcoming
debt exchange. Indeed, Greece
launched such an exchange offer on Feb. 24, 2012.
If the exchange is consummated (which we understand is scheduled to
occur on or about March 12, 2012), we will likely consider the selective
default to be cured and raise the sovereign credit rating on Greece to the
'CCC' category, reflecting our forward-looking assessment of Greece's
creditworthiness. In this context, any potential upgrade to the 'CCC' category
rating would inter alia reflect our view of Greece's uncertain economic growth
prospects and still large government debt, even after the debt restructuring is
concluded.
If a sufficient number of bondholders do not accept the exchange offer,
we believe that Greece would face an imminent outright payment default. This is
because of its lack of access to market funding and the likely unavailability
of additional official financing. The revised financial assistance program
provided by most of the eurozone governments and the Stand-By Credit
Arrangement with the International Monetary Fund are predicated on a successful
exchange offer.
Our T&C assessment for Greece, as for all other eurozone members, is
'AAA'. A T&C assessment reflects our view of the likelihood of a sovereign
restricting nonsovereign access to foreign exchange needed to satisfy the
nonsovereign's debt-service obligations. Our T&C assessment for Greece
expresses our view of the low likelihood of the European
Central Bank restricting
nonsovereign access to foreign currency needed for debt servicing.
If Greece were to withdraw from eurozone membership (which is not our
base-case assumption) and introduce a new local currency, we would reevaluate
our T&C assessment on Greece to reflect our view of the likelihood of the
Greek sovereign and its central bank restricting nonsovereign access to foreign
exchange needed for debt service. Contrary to the current case, in this
scenario, the euro would be a foreign currency, and the Bank of Greece would no
longer be part of the European System of Central Banks. As a result, under our
criteria, the T&C assessment can be at most three notches above the
foreign-currency sovereign credit rating.
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