Standart&Poors
Eurozone ülkeleri ile ilgili basın açıklamasını, basına sızdıktan tam 7 saat 34
dakika sonra, ABD piyasaları kapanmasının ardından yaptı. S&P
açıklamasında, Kıbrıs, İtalya, Portekiz ve İspanya'nın uzun dönemli notunu iki
kademe indirdiğini açıkladı. Ayrıca Fransa, Avusturya, Malta,Slovakya ve
Slovenya'nın notlarını da bir kademe indirdi. Kuruluş ayrıca Belçika, Estonya,
Finladiya, Almanya, İrlanda, Luxemburg ve Hollanda'nın uzun vadeli kredi notunu
değiştirmedi. S&P ayrıca Avusturya, Belçika, Kıbrıs, Estonya,Finlandiya,
Fransa, İrlanda, İtalya, Lüxemburg, Malta, Hollanda, Portekiz, Slovenya ve
İspanya'nın uzun dönem kredi görünümü 'negatif' olarak açıkladı.
RESİME TIKLAYARAK S&P'NİN NOT TABLOSUNU GÖREBİLİRSİNİZ
 |
| Kırmızı notu 2 kademe, Mavi 1 kademe düşen, yeşil aynı kalan ülkeleri gösterir |
- S&P BASIN AÇIKLAMASININ ORJİNALİ İÇİN HABERİN DEVAMINI TIKLAYIN
Standard & Poor's Takes
Various Rating
Actions On 16 Eurozone
Sovereign
Governments
Primary Credit Analyst:
Moritz Kraemer, Frankfurt (49)
69-33-99-9249; moritz_kraemer@standardandpoors.com
Secondary Contact:
Frank Gill, London (44)
20-7176-7129; frank_gill@standardandpoors.com
• In our view, the policy
initiatives taken by European policymakers in
recent weeks may be
insufficient to fully address ongoing systemic
stresses in the eurozone.
• We are lowering our long-term
ratings on nine eurozone sovereigns and
affirming the ratings on seven.
• The outlooks on our ratings
on all but two of the 16 eurozone sovereigns
are negative. The ratings on
all 16 sovereigns have been removed from
CreditWatch, where they were
placed with negative implications on Dec. 5,
2011 (except for Cyprus, which
was first placed on CreditWatch on Aug.
12, 2011).
FRANKFURT (Standard &
Poor's) Jan. 13, 2012--Standard & Poor's Ratings Services today announced
its rating actions on 16 members of the European Economic and Monetary Union
(EMU or eurozone) following completion of its review. We have lowered the
long-term ratings on Cyprus, Italy, Portugal, and Spain by two notches; lowered
the long-term ratings on Austria, France, Malta, Slovakia, and Slovenia, by one
notch; and affirmed the long-term ratings on Belgium, Estonia, Finland, Germany,
Ireland, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. All ratings have been removed from
CreditWatch, where they were placed with negative implications on Dec. 5, 2011
(except for Cyprus, which was first placed on CreditWatch on Aug. 12, 2011).
January 13, 2012
www.standardandpoors.com/ratingsdirect
1
The outlooks on the long-term
ratings on Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia, and Spain are negative,
indicating that we believe that there is at least a one-in-three chance that
the rating will be lowered in 2012 or 2013. The outlook horizon for issuers
with investment-grade ratings is up to two years, and for issuers with
speculative-grade ratings up to one year. The outlooks on the long-term ratings
on Germany and Slovakia are stable.
We assigned recovery ratings of '4' to both
Cyprus and Portugal, in accordance with our practice to assign recovery ratings
to issuers rated in the speculative-grade category, indicating an expected
recovery of 30%-50% should a default occur in the future. Today's rating
actions are primarily driven by our assessment that the policy initiatives that
have been taken by European policymakers in recent weeks may be insufficient to
fully address ongoing systemic stresses in the eurozone. In our view, these
stresses include: (1) tightening credit conditions, (2) an increase in risk
premiums for a widening group of eurozone issuers, (3) asimultaneous attempt to
delever by governments and households, (4) weakening economic growth prospects,
and (5) an open and prolonged dispute among European policymakers over the
proper approach to address challenges.
The
outcomes from the EU summit on Dec. 9, 2011, and subsequent statements from
policymakers, lead us to believe that the agreement reached has not produced a
breakthrough of sufficient size and scope to fully address the eurozone's
financial problems. In our opinion, the political agreement does not supply
sufficient additional resources or operational flexibility to bolster European
rescue operations, or extend enough support for those eurozone sovereigns
subjected to heightened market pressures.
We also believe that the agreement is
predicated on only a partial recognition of the source of the crisis: that the current
financial turmoil stems primarily from fiscal profligacy at the periphery of
the eurozone. In our view, however, the financial problems facing the eurozone
are as much a consequence of rising external imbalances and divergences in
competitiveness between the eurozone's core and the so-called
"periphery". As such, we believe that a reform process based on a
pillar of fiscal austerity alone risks becoming self-defeating, as domestic
demand falls in line with consumers' rising concerns about job security and
disposable incomes, eroding national tax revenues.
Accordingly, in line with our
published sovereign criteria, we have adjusted downward our political scores
(one of the five key factors in our criteria) for those eurozone sovereigns we
had previously scored in our two highest categories. This reflects our view
that the effectiveness, stability, and predictability of European policymaking
and political institutions have not been as strong as we believe are called for
by the severity of a broadening and deepening financial crisis in the eurozone.
In our view, it is increasingly
likely that refinancing costs for certain countries may remain elevated, that
credit availability and economic growth may further decelerate, and that
pressure on financing conditions may persist. Accordingly, for those sovereigns
we consider most at risk of an economic downturn and deteriorating funding
conditions, for example due to their large cross-border financing needs, we
have adjusted our external score downward. On the other hand, we believe that
eurozone monetary authorities have been instrumental in averting a collapse of
market confidence. We see that the European Central Bank has successfully eased
collateral requirements, allowing an ever expanding pool of assets to be used
as collateral for its funding operations, and has lowered the fixed rate to 1%
on its main refinancing operation, an all-time low.
Most importantly in our
view, it has engaged in unprecedented repurchase operations for financial
institutions, greatly relieving the near-term funding pressures for banks.
Accordingly we did not adjust the initial monetary score on any of the 16
sovereigns under review. Moreover, we
affirmed the ratings on the seven eurozone sovereigns that we believe are
likely to be more resilient in light of their relatively strong external
positions and less leveraged public and private sectors. These credit strengths
remain robust enough, in our opinion, to neutralise the potential ratings
impact from the lowering of our political score.
However, for those sovereigns
with negative outlooks, we believe that downside risks persist and that a more
adverse economic and financial environment could erode their relative strengths
within the next year or two to a degree that in our view could warrant a
further downward revision of their long-term ratings. We believe that the main
downside risks that could affect eurozone sovereigns to various degrees are
related to the possibility of further significant fiscal deterioration as a
consequence of a more recessionary macroeconomic environment and/or
vulnerabilities to further intensification and broadening of risk aversion
among investors, jeopardizing funding access at sustainable rates.
A more
severe financial and economic downturn than we currently envisage (see
"Sovereign Risk Indicators", published Dec. 28, 2011) could also lead
to rising stress levels in the European banking system, potentially leading to
additional fiscal costs for the sovereigns through various bank workout or
recapitalization programs. Furthermore, we believe that there is a risk that
reform fatigue could be mounting, especially in those countries that have
experienced deep recessions and where growth prospects remain bleak, which could eventually lead us to the view
that lower levels of predictability exist in policy orientation, and thus to a
further downward adjustment of our political score.
Finally, while we currently
assess the monetary authorities' response to the eurozone's financial problems
as broadly adequate, our view could change as the crisis and the response to it
evolves. If we lowered our initial monetary score for all eurozone sovereigns
as a result, this could have negative consequences for the ratings on a number
of countries.
In this context, we would note
that the ratings on the eurozone sovereigns remain at comparatively high
levels, with only three below investment grade (Portugal, Cyprus, and Greece).
Historically, investment-grade-rated sovereigns have experienced very low
default rates. From 1975 to 2010, the 15-year cumulative default rate for
sovereigns rated in investment grade was 1.02%, and 0.00% for sovereigns rated
in the 'A' category or higher. During this period, 97.78% of sovereigns rated
'AAA' at the beginning of the year retained their rating at the end of the
year.
Following today's rating
actions, Standard & Poor's will issue separate media releases concerning
affected ratings on the funds, government-related entities, financial
institutions, insurance companies, public finance, andstructured finance
sectors in due course.
