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| DÜNYA PETROL TRAFİĞİ |
İran'ın yeni nükleer
tesisini yakında faaliyete geçireceğini duyurmasının ardından gözler yeniden
Doğu'ya çevrildi. Fransız Societe General Bankası'nın hazırladığı en son rapora
göre, İran olası bir gerginlikte Hürmüz Boğazı'nı kapatabilir. Ancak İran bu
uygulamayı en fazla iki hafta sürdürebilir. SocGen, böylesi bir durumda petrol
fiyatının 150-200$ bandına çıkabileceğini belirtti. Banka eğer AB'nin İran'a petrol ambargosu uygulaması durumunda ise petrol fiyatının 125-150$'a çıkabileceğini öngördü. Hürmüz Boğazı'nda günde 15
milyon varil petrol taşınıyor. En son, İran Atom Enerjisi Kurumu Başkanı Feridun Abbasi Davani, Kayhan
gazetesine verdiği mülakatta, Fordow nükleer zenginleştirme tesisisinin yakında
faaliyete başlayacağını söyledi. Bankanın raporunun orjinali için haberin devamını tıklayın.
İRAN HABERLERİ (Başlıkların üzerine tıklayın):
SocGen lays out the worst-case scenario:
We believe it would be relatively easy for
Iran to shut down the Straits of Hormuz, but that they would not be able
to keep it shut for long. Importantly, Iran would not actually need to succeed
in sinking an oil tanker or a naval ship to shut down the Straits. A
credible threat would be enough to shut down oil shipments, because tanker
insurers would stop coverage and traffic would cease. Threats could
include mining the Straits; launching a surface-to-ship missile or maybe
even just arming launch radars on those installations; or swarming armed small
fast patrol boats around tankers – all of which would be detected by routine
naval and
air patrols conducted by the Western allies.
That said, we do not believe the Western allies would allow the Straits to be shut for a
prolonged period. A disruption to oil flows would be considered a national and economic security threat, and if necessary, military force would be used to re-open the shipping lanes in the Persian Gulf. Our view is that Iran would not be able to keep the Straits closed for more than 2 weeks. In addition, after the re-opening, it would be possible to maintain security through the use of naval escorts for tankers, as happened during the 1980s Iran-Iraq war.
In the event of a shutdown of the Straits of Hormuz, disrupting 15 Mb/d of crude flows, we would expect Brent prices to spike into the $150-200 range for a limited time period. The disruption would definitely result in an IEA strategic release. Lastly, the severe price spike would sharply hurt economic and oil demand growth, and from that standpoint, be self- correcting. A Straits of Hormuz shutdown is not likely; we estimate the probability of this very
high impact event at 5%. Although Iran may like the idea of retaliation and hurting its perceived enemies, it would hurt itself even more, by halting its oil export revenues. Moreover, Iran would do this at the cost of provoking a military response that would destroy much of its military and perhaps even target its nuclear program.
air patrols conducted by the Western allies.
That said, we do not believe the Western allies would allow the Straits to be shut for a
prolonged period. A disruption to oil flows would be considered a national and economic security threat, and if necessary, military force would be used to re-open the shipping lanes in the Persian Gulf. Our view is that Iran would not be able to keep the Straits closed for more than 2 weeks. In addition, after the re-opening, it would be possible to maintain security through the use of naval escorts for tankers, as happened during the 1980s Iran-Iraq war.
In the event of a shutdown of the Straits of Hormuz, disrupting 15 Mb/d of crude flows, we would expect Brent prices to spike into the $150-200 range for a limited time period. The disruption would definitely result in an IEA strategic release. Lastly, the severe price spike would sharply hurt economic and oil demand growth, and from that standpoint, be self- correcting. A Straits of Hormuz shutdown is not likely; we estimate the probability of this very
high impact event at 5%. Although Iran may like the idea of retaliation and hurting its perceived enemies, it would hurt itself even more, by halting its oil export revenues. Moreover, Iran would do this at the cost of provoking a military response that would destroy much of its military and perhaps even target its nuclear program.
